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Price squeeze abuses lie at the crossroad between different forms of potentially 
anticompetitive conduct, as well as between antitrust law and regulation. A price 
squeeze may occur when a vertically integrated monopolist sells an upstream input to 
firms that compete with the monopolist itself in the production of a downstream 
product sold to end users. The vertically integrated monopolist can reduce the margin 
between the input price charged to competing firms and the price charged in the 
downstream market for the end product incorporating that particular input. Competition 
concerns arise when the margin is negative or too small to enable downstream 
competitors to achieve a sufficient profit level, so as to make entry difficult or to 
encourage exit. 
Price squeeze has been the subject of some of the most controversial and 
debated antitrust cases decided in the last few years in the US and the EU, as well as of 
intensive enforcement activity by competition and regulatory authorities in several EU 
Member States. The law of price squeeze has undergone important developments both 
in the US and the EU, following the judgments of the US Supreme Court in linkLine 
and of the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Deutsche Telekom.1 Furthermore, the 
Commission decision in the Telefónica case and the Guidance on Article 82 EC 
(Guidance) have provided additional clarifications on the Commission’s approach to 
price squeeze abuses.2 
                                                 
∗ A previous version of this paper was delivered at the Annual Conference of the European Association 
of Law and Economics (EALE), LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy, September 17-19, 2009, with the title 
“Price Squeeze Abuses after linkLine and Deutsche Telekom”. 
** Research Scholar, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy, and Law and Economics Lab, Rome, Italy. 
Associate, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Rome, Italy. E-mail comments to gfaella@luiss.it. 
*** Full Professor of Comparative Law, Faculty of Economics, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy. 
Director, Law and Economics Lab, Rome, Italy. E-mail comments to rpardole@luiss.it. 
1 See Pacific Bell Telephone Co., dba AT&T California, et al. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., et al., 
555 U.S. ___ (2009); CFI, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477. 
2 See Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38784/dec_en.pdf; Communication 
from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, Brussels, 9.2.2009, C(2009) 
864 final. The appeal pending before the CFI in the Telefónica case is expected to clarify some additional 
issues that are still the subject of controversy under EC competition rules. 
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Section 2 of the paper discusses the basic issue of the nature of price squeeze 
abuses. In light of the conclusions drawn in Section 2 and the recent developments in 
US and EU antitrust practice, the following sections analyze some of the most 
controversial issues in the treatment of price squeeze, namely: (i) the admissibility and 
utility of an analytical framework for the assessment of price squeeze under antitrust 
law (Section 3); (ii) the need for a duty to deal based on antitrust rules and, possibly, 
other sets of rules (Section 4); and (iii) the structure of the cost-based test (Section 5). 
In addition, Section 6 provides some additional remarks on the role of efficiencies in 
price squeeze cases, taking into account the indications provided by the Guidance. 
Section 7 contains conclusions. 
 
2. The Nature of Price Squeeze Abuses 
 
In the last few years, it has been widely debated as to whether price squeeze 
should be considered a separate antitrust infringement.3 A price squeeze strategy could 
be implemented through upstream and downstream pricing policies that may be 
independently unlawful under competition rules. The upstream price may be excessive 
or discriminatory, and it may amount to a constructive refusal to deal. The downstream 
price may be predatory. Given this alternative, the question that has arisen in the 
academic debate and actual practice is whether a combination of a lawful wholesale 
price and a non-predatory retail price can be characterized as exclusionary conduct 
based on the analysis of the margin between the two prices. 
 
2.1.      A Taxonomy 
 
Actually, a price squeeze can exclude an equally efficient rival if the upstream-
downstream price differential is lower than the incumbent’s own downstream costs. 
The margin may be squeezed by raising wholesale prices, lowering retail prices, or 
both. However, this kind of essential taxonomy obfuscates the fact that the ability to 
manipulate a rival’s margin may hinge on different situations, which can be 
distinguished by looking at the price that is paid, or should be paid, by the downstream 
division of a vertically integrated firm for the supply of the relevant input. 
If the downstream division of the vertically integrated firm is a separate legal 
entity, the price paid for the input is normally specified by intra-group supply contracts. 
Conversely, if the upstream and downstream activities are carried out by the same 
company, there is no visible price. In some instances, sector-specific regulations 
impose on vertically integrated firms an obligation to specify the internal transfer 
charges (i.e., the prices that should be paid by the downstream division for the supply 
of certain inputs), by means of specific service contracts and separate accounts.4 
                                                 
3 See, in particular, J.G. SIDAK, Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 Journal 
of Competition Law & Economics 279 (2008); D.W. CARLTON, Should “Price Squeeze” Be a 
Recognized Form of Anticompetitive Conduct?, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 271 (2008); 
and H.J. HOVENKAMP-E.N. HOVENKAMP, The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, University of 
Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 08-33 (October 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156974. 
4 Some companies may spontaneously decide to prepare separate accounts with a view to having a more 
accurate picture of internal activities and results achieved by different divisions.  
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Needless to say, intra-group prices and internal transfer charges, where existent 
and identifiable, represent a useful analytical tool for the assessment of price squeeze 
policies. Suppose that internal prices or transfer charges exist and can be identified. If 
the dominant firm charges an internal price or transfer charge lower than the external 
price, the costs of its downstream division will be lower than those borne by 
downstream competitors. As a consequence, the downstream division will be able to set 
a final price that equally efficient rivals will not be able to match. In this case, a price 
squeeze would arise from a classic form of price discrimination aimed at privileging the 
downstream operations of the vertically integrated firm.5 
On the contrary, assuming that the internal price or transfer charge is equal to 
the external price charged to rivals, the dominant firm could exclude equally efficient 
competitors only by offering downstream prices lower than the costs borne by the 
downstream division (downstream predation). Note, however, that the downstream 
predation could be subsidized by the exploitative level of the input price. The 
exclusionary strategy would not give rise to a loss for the dominant firm, but only an 
internal redistribution of profits. Equally efficient rivals would not be able to compete, 
although the analysis of the overall costs of the dominant firm would exclude 
predation.6 
On some occasions, a price squeeze may arise even though the dominant firm 
does not discriminate or engage in downstream predation. If the cost of supplying an 
input to rivals is higher than the cost of providing the same input to an internal 
downstream division, a price squeeze may be the result of the cost savings resulting 
from the vertical integration of the dominant firm.7 In this case, equally efficient 
competitors may be excluded, even though there is nothing inherently negative in the 
pricing policy of the dominant firm. 
 
2.2.      … and its By-Products 
 
Assuming that the costs of supplying an input to rivals and to internal 
downstream divisions do not differ, a price squeeze may arise only from a form of 
internal-external discrimination, which puts rivals at a competitive disadvantage by 
raising their costs (discriminatory price squeeze), or from a downstream predation (i.e., 
                                                 
5 The discrimination would be particularly harmful, as the competitive disadvantage would be so 
significant that equally efficient downstream rivals would be unable to compete. 
6 We assume that the price of the end product is not predatory. If this were not the case, the practice 
could be simply analyzed on the basis of standard principles on predatory pricing. 
7 Suppose that a vertically integrated dominant firm produces the input A and the end product B. The 
production cost of A is equal to 10 and the additional downstream costs borne to produce B amount to 5. 
Supplying A to third parties imposes on the dominant firm an additional cost of 2 (for instance, due to 
the need to interconnect the network of the dominant firm with those of competitors). The dominant firm 
sells A at a price equal to its cost to both its downstream division and rivals (i.e., 10 for the downstream 
division and 12 for third parties). At the same time, the vertically integrated firm charges a price equal to 
16 for B. An equally efficient downstream rival would not be able to compete, as the margin between the 
external price of A and the price of B is lower than the downstream costs. However, the conduct is 
neither discriminatory nor predatory. It is not discriminatory, because the difference between the internal 
transfer charge and the external price of A is justified by different production costs. It is not predatory, 
because the price of product B is sufficient to cover all the downstream costs of the dominant firms. 
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downstream prices lower than the costs of the downstream division of the dominant 
firm), normally financed by a cross-subsidization (predatory price squeeze).8 
Were it possible to identify the internal prices or transfer charges in all cases, 
price squeeze abuses could be simply analyzed on the basis of general principles on 
exploitation, price discrimination and predatory pricing. If the downstream price is 
predatory, in that it does not cover the costs of the downstream operations (including 
the cost of procuring the input), standard principles on predatory pricing apply.9 If 
there is actual discrimination by the dominant firm in favor of its own downstream 
operations, there may be a violation of Article 82, lett. c), EC. Possibly, the upstream 
external price could amount to a constructive refusal to deal (i.e., an extreme form of 
discrimination). If there is neither downstream predation nor upstream discrimination, 
there is no risk of exclusion of equally efficient competitors. But then we are left with 
the possibility that the upstream price to non-integrated rivals is excessive under Article 
82, lett. a), EC, which would be true whether or not there were a separate abuse of 
margin squeeze. In sum, there is no need for a price squeeze theory under antitrust 
rules. 
However, when the downstream division of the dominant firm is not a separate 
legal entity, distinguishing discriminatory and predatory price squeezes may turn out to 
be impossible, as internal transfer charges are absent in many concrete settings of 
vertical integration. In this case, the only observable factual element is the squeeze of 
competitors’ margins, which the dominant firms can realize by raising the upstream 
external price, lowering the downstream price, or doing both. The fact that the 
difference between upstream and downstream prices is lower than the downstream 
costs of the dominant firm indicates that the latter must have engaged in (at least) one 
of the two practices: either the internal transfer charge is lower than the external price, 
or the downstream price does not cover the costs of the dominant firm’s downstream 
operations. 
Under this point of view, a price squeeze does not represent a separate antitrust 
infringement, but rather the external manifestation of practices that would be 
autonomously relevant under antitrust rules. Nonetheless, a price squeeze analysis, 
leading to a coherent framework, can be useful if intended as a tool to detect conduct 
that would be unlawful on the basis of other traditional theories of antitrust liability but 
is not directly observable from the outside, due to the vertical integration of the 
dominant firm and the lack of internal prices or transfer charges. 
 
                                                 
8 Obviously, the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, as a dominant firm can engage 
simultaneously in upstream discrimination and downstream predation. 
9 An example is offered by the Wanadoo case (see Commission decision of 16 July 2003, Wanadoo 
Interactive, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38233/en.pdf). The 
Commission assessed the conduct at issue in that case as predatory pricing instead of price squeeze, 
because the wholesale and retail services were not offered by a single, vertically integrated company. 
The downstream operator (Wanadoo) was independent in legal terms from the upstream operator (France 
Télécom). Interestingly, the abuse was not brought to an end by Wanadoo through a retail price increase, 
but rather by France Télécom through a reduction of the wholesale tariff. However, it should be noted 
that, unlike standard cases of predatory pricing, in predatory margin squeeze cases recoupment could be 
simultaneous, as downstream losses could be financed by cross-subsidies. 
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3. The Limits of a Price Squeeze Analysis under Antitrust Rules 
 
The above analysis helps to clarify the limits of a price squeeze analysis under 
antitrust rules. The question is whether a price squeeze analysis is admissible and 
useful under antitrust rules and, if so, what are the limits of antitrust intervention in 
price squeeze cases. As often happens in the field of unilateral conduct, there is a 
remarkable distance between the approaches adopted in the US and the EU. 
 
3.1. The US Experience 
 
In the US, price squeezes were recognized as a form of antitrust liability by the 
1945 judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Alcoa.10 In this well-
known opinion, Judge Learned Hand stated that a price squeeze infringes Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act when: (i) the vertically integrated firm holds a monopoly power in the 
upstream market; (ii) the upstream price is higher than a “fair price”; and (iii) the 
downstream price is so low that its competitors cannot match the price and still make a 
“living profit”.11 
Judge Hand’s opinion was based on the questionable assumption that the 
Sherman Act aims at preserving, “for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an 
organization of industry in small units”.12 Some decades later, most courts and 
commentators endorsed the view that the main goal of antitrust rules should be the 
protection of consumer welfare. Judge Hand’s view on the aim of the Sherman Act 
became obsolete and was severely criticized.13 The concepts of “fair price” and “living 
profit” were difficult to reconcile with the increasing focus on consumer welfare. 
Nonetheless, the opinion of Judge Hand in Alcoa continued to represent a fundamental 
reference point for lower courts and other Courts of Appeals for several years.14 
In 2004, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Trinko opened the way for a 
critical review of the foundations of the price squeeze theory. The Supreme Court 
warned against the use of antitrust rules to impose duties to deal on dominant firms.15 
Under Trinko, if an antitrust duty to deal exists, it is an extraordinarily narrow one. The 
                                                 
10 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
11 Id., at 437-448. 
12 Id., at 429. 
13 See R.H. BORK, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, New York: Basic Books (1978), 
52 (the Alcoa judgment “seems to be asserting the right to trade off consumer welfare for unarticulated 
social values”); R. POSNER, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press (1976), 103, 196, 250 and 263 (Alcoa’s view on the aim of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act is “discredited”, “defunct” and “no longer the law”). 
14 See, for instance, City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982); City of Groton 
v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981); City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. 
Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980). However, in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., Judge 
Breyer criticized the concepts of “fair price” and “living profits”, on the grounds that they were too 
vague and obliged courts to behave as regulatory authorities. Furthermore, Judge Breyer held that a price 
squeeze does not infringe Section 2 of the Sherman Act when both upstream and downstream prices are 
regulated. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990). Contra, see City 
of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1992). 
15 The Supreme Court warned: “compelling … firms to share the source of their advantage is in some 
tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law”. Furthermore, “no court should impose a duty to 
deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise”. See Verizon Communications Inc., 
Petitioner v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, ___ (2004). 
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Supreme Court suggested that, based on Aspen Skiing, an exception to the principle of 
contractual freedom may exist when there is a previous course of dealing and the 
dominant firm changes the terms of the relationship in a way that disadvantages its 
rival.16 Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that, if a dominant firm is not subject to 
a duty to deal under antitrust rules, it is not obliged to guarantee a minimum level of 
assistance in the provision of service to rivals.17 The extension of the same logic to 
price conditions would have precluded price squeeze claims, but for the exceptional 
cases in which an antitrust duty to deal existed. 
Immediately before and after Trinko, the US Courts of Appeals analyzed a 
series of price squeeze cases in the telecommunications sector. Despite the strong 
similarities between the fact patterns of different cases,18 the Courts of Appeals reached 
conflicting conclusions as to the admissibility of price squeeze claims in the absence of 
an antitrust duty to deal.19 
The linkLine case gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to clarify the law of 
price squeezes. The facts of the case were similar to those of the other price squeeze 
cases in the telecommunications sector. Four ISPs brought suit against AT&T, alleging 
inter alia that the incumbent engaged in a price squeeze aimed at monopolizing the 
DSL market in California, by setting a high wholesale price for DSL transport and a 
low retail price for DSL Internet service. The Supreme Court analyzed separately the 
prices of the incumbent at the two levels. With regard to the upstream market, the 
Supreme Court stated that, under Trinko, a vertically integrated monopolist with no 
antitrust duty to deal in the wholesale market has no obligation to deal under terms and 
                                                 
16 Id., at 410; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-611 (1985). While 
Aspen was not overruled, the Supreme Court characterized that decision as residing “at or near the outer 
boundary of § 2 liability”. See Verizon Communications Inc., Petitioner v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 399 (2004). Recently, in Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 
Ltd., 555 F. 3d 1188 (2009), which like Aspen Skiing involved alleged monopolization by a ski resort 
that terminated a prior course of dealing with a rival, the Tenth Circuit’s decision affirming dismissal of 
the complaint distinguished Aspen Skiing on the ground that the defendant had a valid business reason 
for the termination whereas the defendant in Aspen Skiing was willing to forsake short-term profits to 
achieve an anticompetitive goal. 
17 Verizon Communications Inc., Petitioner v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 410 
(2004). 
18 In the cases concerned, the plaintiffs were Internet service providers (ISPs), which sold digital 
subscriber lines (DSL) service to retail consumers, or competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), 
which provided ISPs with DSL lines rented from incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). The ILECs 
were vertically integrated operators, which owned and operated local wireline telephone networks and, at 
the same time, sold retail DSL services. Competitors in the downstream markets needed access to some 
of the facilities that were part of the ILEC wireline network. Although cable facilities could also be used 
to provide high-speed Internet access, the ILECs were, with few exceptions, the only operators providing 
wholesale access services to the ISPs, as a result of asymmetric regulation. In this scenario, some 
competitors claimed that the margins between the wholesale and retail tariffs were so low that they could 
not profitably compete on the downstream markets. 
19 See Covad Communications Company v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004); LinkLine 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 882-883 (9th Cir. 2007) (price squeeze may infringe Section 
2 of the Sherman Act even when a vertically integrated monopolist has no antitrust duty to deal). Contra, 
see Covad Communications Company v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005), citing P.E. 
AREEDA-H. HOVENKAMP, Antitrust Law, IIIA, second edition, New York, Aspen Publisher, 2002, 767c5 
(“it makes no sense to prohibit a predatory price squeeze in circumstances where the integrated 
monopolist is free to refuse to deal”). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached similar 
conclusions in Cavalier Telephone, LLC v. Verizon Virginia, Inc., 330 F.3d 176, 190 (4th Cir. 2003), 
which predates Trinko. 
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conditions favorable to its competitors.20 With reference to the downstream market, the 
Supreme Court recalled that, under Brooke Group, the price charged by a vertically 
integrated monopolist for the end product is unlawful only when: (i) the price is below 
an appropriate cost measure; and (ii) there is a dangerous probability that the defendant 
will be able to recoup the losses caused by below-cost pricing. 
The Supreme Court concluded that “if both the wholesale price and the retail 
price are independently lawful, there is no basis for imposing antitrust liability simply 
because a vertically integrated firm’s wholesale price happens to be greater than or 
equal to its retail prices”.21 The plaintiffs’ price squeeze claim was “nothing more than 
an amalgamation of a meritless claim at the retail level and a meritless claim at the 
wholesale level”. If there is no antitrust duty to deal at the wholesale level and no 
predatory pricing at the retail level, a vertically integrated firm “is certainly not 
required to price both of these services in a manner that preserves its rivals’ profit 
margins”.22 
 
3.2. Price Squeeze Abuses in the EU 
 
Under EC competition law, a price squeeze strategy implemented by a vertically 
integrated firm may constitute an abuse of dominant position.23 However, for many 
years, the paucity of precedents and the uncertainties on the legal basis of the 
prohibition of price squeeze abuses led some commentators to wonder whether the 
practice constitutes an autonomous antitrust infringement, or simply an aspect of other 
anticompetitive behaviors, such as excessive prices, cross-subsidies and predatory 
prices. 
In the first price squeeze cases, the Commission suggested that the practice 
could be a separate infringement of Article 82 EC.24 In 1998, the Commission 
confirmed that price squeeze may constitute an abuse of dominance in the Notice on 
the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
                                                 
20 The Supreme Court held that there was no meaningful distinction between the “insufficient assistance” 
claims rejected in Trinko and the price squeeze claims in the linkLine case. According to the Court, “for 
antitrust purposes, there is no reason to distinguish between price and nonprice components”. See Pacific 
Bell Telephone Co., dba AT&T California, et al. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., et al., 555 U.S. ___ 
(2009). 
21 Id., __. 
22 Id., __. 
23 On the European cases, see D. GERADIN-R. O’DONOGHUE, The Concurrent Application of 
Competition Law and Regulation: the Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications 
Sector, 1 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 355 (2005). 
24 The practice was analyzed by the Commission for the first time in National Carbonising. In an interim 
decision, the Commission stated that the supplier of an essential input may have “an obligation to arrange 
its prices so as to allow a reasonably efficient manufacturer of the derivative a margin sufficient to enable 
it to survive in the long-term”. See Commission decision of 29 October 1975, National Coal Board, 
National Smokeless Fuels Limited and National Carbonising Company Limited, O.J. L 35/6 (1976). 
Some years later, in British Sugar/Napier Brown, the Commission affirmed: “[t]he maintaining, by a 
dominant company, which is dominant in the markets for both a raw material and a corresponding 
derived product, of a margin between the [prices of the two products], which is insufficient to reflect that 
dominant company’s own costs of transformation … with the result that competition in the derived 
product is restricted, is an abuse of dominant position”. Commission decision of 18 July 1988, Case 
IV/30.178, Napier Brown/British Sugar, O.J. L 284/41 (1988), § 66. 
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sector.25 However, the judgment delivered in 2000 by the CFI in Industrie des Poudres 
Sphériques seemed to cast doubts on the admissibility of a separate price squeeze 
abuse, as the CFI suggested that the pricing policy of a vertically integrated firm is not 
unlawful if the upstream price is not abusive and the downstream price is not 
predatory.26 
In the subsequent years, the Community institutions clarified that price squeeze 
abuses constitute a recognized form of antitrust liability under EC law, in two cases 
concerning the telecommunications sector. In 2003, in Deutsche Telekom, the 
Commission fined the German incumbent for having implemented a prolonged price 
squeeze policy, aimed at excluding rivals from the retail markets for broadband and 
narrowband Internet access services.27 The Commission stated that a price squeeze may 
infringe Article 82 EC when the margin between downstream and upstream prices is 
negative or, in any case, insufficient to cover the costs borne by the vertically 
integrated firm to supply its own services in the downstream market.28 
In 2007, in Telefónica, the Commission fined a similar commercial policy 
implemented by the Spanish incumbent. The Commission held that, based on previous 
decision practice and case law, a price squeeze strategy may constitute “a clear-cut 
abuse”.29 The Commission specified that the rationale for the prohibition of price 
squeezes lies in the “disproportion between an upstream and a downstream price”. As a 
consequence, “there is no need to demonstrate that either the wholesale price is 
excessive in itself or that the retail price is predatory in itself”.30 
Finally, in April 2008, the Deutsche Telekom judgment of the CFI confirmed 
that price squeeze is a separate infringement of Article 82 EC. The Court explicitly 
rejected the argument that, if the upstream tariffs are regulated, the unlawfulness of a 
price squeeze may result only from the predatory nature of downstream tariffs. 
According to the Court, the anticompetitive nature of the conduct was linked to the 
“unfairness of the spread” between upstream and downstream prices, regardless of 
whether those prices were abusive as such.31 
Some months later, the Guidance on Article 82 EC explicitly included price 
squeeze abuses among the priorities of the Commission enforcement. Price squeeze 
                                                 
25 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector, O.J. C 265/2 (1998), in particular §§ 117-118. 
26 See CFI, Case T-5/97 BPB Industrie des Poudres Sphériques SA v. Commission [2000] ECR II-3755, 
§§ 169-186. According to the CFI, “[i]n the absence of abusive prices being charged by [a dominant 
firm] for the raw material … or of predatory pricing for the derived product …, the fact that the applicant 
cannot, seemingly because of its higher processing costs, remain competitive in the sale of the derived 
product cannot justify characterising [the dominant firm’s] pricing policy as abusive”. Id., § 179. 
However, the CFI held, in addition, that the applicant had not demonstrated a price squeeze capable of 
excluding an equally efficient competitor from the downstream market. Id., §§ 180-182. 
27 Commission decision of 21 May 2003, Cases COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom 
AG, O.J. L 263/09 (2003). 
28 Id., §§ 102, 107, 140. 
29 Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, ____, §§ 
731-736 and 740. 
30 Id., § 283. 
31 CFI, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, §§ 166-168. However, 
according to some commentators, the Deutsche Telekom judgment could also be read as implying that, 
when downstream prices are not predatory, a price squeeze would be unlawful only in case of excessive 
prices in the upstream market. See F.E. GONZÁLEZ DÍAZ-J. PADILLA, The linkLine Judgment – A 
European Perspective, in GCP, APR-09 (1). 
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strategies were analogized to constructive refusal to deal and subject to principles and 
criteria consistent with those applicable to other cases of refusal to deal.32 
 
3.3. The Scope for a Price Squeeze Analysis under Antitrust Law: Some Critical 
Remarks 
 
There is a remarkable divergence between the US and the EU in the assessment 
of price squeeze cases under antitrust law. The Supreme Court judgment in linkLine 
does not preclude any possibility of intervention in price squeeze cases. Although the 
Supreme Court held that price squeeze is not a stand-alone antitrust offence, an 
upstream price that is too high relative to the downstream price could still be 
considered a constructive refusal to deal infringing Section 2 of the Sherman Act.33 
However, the application of the principles on refusal to deal established by Trinko left 
extremely limited scope for antitrust intervention in price squeeze cases.34 Conversely, 
in the EU price squeeze constitutes an established form of antitrust liability and one of 
the priorities of the enforcement policies of the Commission and national competition 
authorities. 
Some commentators have questioned the admissibility and the utility of a price 
squeeze theory under antitrust rules. It has been noted that, if upstream and downstream 
prices are not independently incompatible with competition rules, the fact that a margin 
squeeze makes it difficult for rivals to compete in a downstream market could not give 
rise to an antitrust infringement. The insufficiency of downstream margins could only 
justify a possible intervention of regulatory agencies through procompetitive measures 
specifically aimed at facilitating the entry and expansion of minor competitors.35 The 
prevention of price squeeze strategies would be a regulatory issue, which should be 
addressed through price regulation in industries characterized by the imposition of a 
duty to deal.36 Courts and antitrust authorities should not second-guess the assessment 
of regulatory agencies. An intervention based on antitrust rules would interfere with 
regulatory measures in force and could frustrate their effects.37 Furthermore, the 
economic and factual complexity of determining whether efficient competitors can earn 
some level of profit deemed to be sufficient would counsel against the application of 
antitrust rules in price squeeze cases.38 
It has also been noted that an antitrust rule based on the idea that a vertically 
integrated dominant company should guarantee rivals’ profit margins would protect the 
welfare of competitors instead of that of consumers, on the discredited assumption that 
                                                 
32 See COMMISSION, Guidance, supra note __, § 80. 
33 According to some commentators, if an antitrust duty to deal exists, both a price squeeze claim and a 
de facto refusal to deal claim would be viable. However, the distinction would have limited practical 
importance, as the same set of facts likely would, in many cases, support both claims. See T. BARNETT-S. 
GASKINS-J. GRAUBERT, Price Squeeze Claims Succumb to Need for “Clear Rules”, in GCP, APR-09 (1).  
34 “As a practical matter, linkLine represents the end of the price squeeze as an independent antitrust 
claim”: S. MARTIN, The linkLine decision: Section 2 Gets Squeezed Further, in GCP, APR-09 (1).  
35 In the EU, this approach would be consistent with the Community principle of subsidiarity. See F.E. 
GONZÁLEZ DÍAZ-J. PADILLA, supra note __. 
36 See J.G. SIDAK, supra note __; W.J. BAUMOL ET AL., Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in 
Law and Economics in Support of Petitioners, Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., No. 07-
512 (October 2007). 
37 See J.G. SIDAK, supra note __. 
38 W.J. BAUMOL ET AL., supra note __. 
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antitrust rules should ensure the presence of a minimum number of independent firms 
in the market.39 
In addition, antitrust intervention could deter procompetitive and efficient 
conduct and hinder an effective price competition in the downstream market. The threat 
of a price squeeze claim could be read as an invitation to abstain from reducing 
downstream prices and to maintain a price umbrella for minor rivals. Thus, a ban on 
price squeeze strategies could have perverse effects, since it could favor a flow of 
sensitive information and could give firms an effective tool to elude the per se ban on 
collusion and to promote price stability and coordination.40 
A further potential perverse effect of antitrust intervention in price squeeze 
cases is represented by the incentives to stop supplying the input to other operators or 
to exit the downstream market. If there is no duty to deal in the upstream market, a ban 
on price squeeze could led the vertically integrated firm not to supply the input 
concerned to competitors, in order to avoid the exposure to price squeeze claims. This 
could harm consumers, especially when one or more downstream competitors would 
have used the input supplied by the vertically integrated monopolist to commercialize 
products different from those of the dominant firm. On the other hand, if there is a duty 
to deal, a ban on price squeeze could induce the vertically integrated monopolist to 
raise the price of its end product or cease production in the downstream market, in 
order to avoid any risk of violating antitrust rules. Even in this case, consumers may be 
harmed, if downstream competitors are less efficient than the vertically integrated 
firm.41 
The above-mentioned criticisms highlight the necessity to shape an analytical 
framework for the assessment of price squeeze within limits consistent with the aims 
and guiding principles of competition law. A price squeeze theory based on the idea 
that non-integrated rivals should be granted a reasonable or fair profit margin should 
have no place in competition law. Protection of minor rivals and active promotion of 
effective competition are objectives that could be pursued by a regulatory authority in 
the initial phase of the development of a market. For the purposes of antitrust rules, 
what matters is the risk of exclusion of equally efficient competitors through conduct 
inconsistent with the paradigm of competition on the merits. 
Nonetheless, an analytical framework for the assessment of price squeeze 
strategies, consistent with the aims and fundamental principles of competition law, can 
be a useful enforcement tool. As noted above, a price squeeze may arise from internal-
external discrimination (discriminatory price squeeze) or downstream predation 
(predatory price squeeze).42 If the upstream and downstream activities are carried out 
by separate legal entities, or internal transfer charges are clearly specified and 
observable, it is possible to distinguish the two hypotheses, which could be analyzed on 
the basis of general principles on price discrimination and predatory pricing. However, 
                                                 
39 See J.G. SIDAK, supra note __. 
40 “[A]ny suggestion by the downstream competitor that the monopolist raise its retail price to eliminate 
the price squeeze is equivalent to solicitation of price fixing. The vertically integrated monopolist must 
navigate between the Scylla of monopolization liability and the Charybdis of price-fixing liability”: J.G. 
SIDAK, supra note __. See also H.J. HOVENKAMP-E.N. HOVENKAMP, supra note __, according to whom 
a rule entitling minor competitors to a minimum profit margin “would virtually require price fixing … 
This fact alone counsels strongly against an expansive price squeeze rule”. 
41 See D.W. CARLTON, supra note __. 
42 See supra, § __. 
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if the downstream division of the vertically integrated firm is not a separate legal entity 
and there are no internal transfer charges, the only observable factual element would be 
the price squeeze. In this case, a properly defined analytical framework for the 
assessment of price squeeze allows for detection of potentially anticompetitive conduct 
of a discriminatory or predatory nature, that is not directly observable due to the 
vertical integration of the dominant firm and the lack of internal prices or transfer 
charges. Refraining from intervening in price squeeze cases would give rise to a 
disparity of treatment between companies operating directly at different stages of the 
production chain and vertically integrated firms structured in separate legal entities. 
The application of antitrust rules should be based on the economic impact of the 
contested practice, rather than formalistic considerations. Moreover, the disparity of 
treatment between the two cases would distort the incentives of vertically integrated 
firms in the definition of their internal organization. 
Furthermore, to the extent that a refusal to deal by a dominant firm is considered 
unlawful under antitrust rules, it should be possible to intervene to control price 
squeezes, in order to prevent an elusion of the duty to supply. A dominant firm could 
easily circumvent a duty to supply by reducing the margin between upstream and 
downstream prices to a level that does not allow equally efficient rivals to compete. 
Even linkLine recognizes the possibility of intervening when the vertically integrated 
monopolist has an antitrust duty to deal. In the US, the extremely limited scope for 
antitrust intervention in price squeeze cases reflects the strict limits within which an 
antitrust duty to deal may exist under Trinko. In the EU, the need for an analytical 
framework for the assessment of price squeeze is stronger than in the US, as the range 
of antitrust duties to deal that may be imposed on dominant firms is much broader. 
In conclusion, although price squeeze does not represent a separate antitrust 
infringement, an analytical framework for the assessment of price squeeze cases can be 
useful, provided that it is intended as a tool to detect anticompetitive conduct of a 
discriminatory or predatory nature. Any antitrust analytical framework for the 
assessment of price squeeze should be construed in accordance with basic aims and 
principles of competition rules. The application of EC competition rules to the most 
relevant European margin squeeze cases – i.e., the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica 
cases – has been largely influenced by regulatory criteria and considerations, which 
affected the resolution of some critical issues raised by the assessment of the practice.43 
This approach could lead to inconsistencies within the antitrust system. While 
regulatory agencies may enjoy a certain degree of discretion in the definition of 
measures aimed at promoting the entry and growth of minor competitors, antitrust 
intervention in price squeeze cases should be subject to limits and criteria consistent 
with the other doctrines of antitrust liability. 
A discussion of all the facets of the analysis of price squeeze cases under 
competition rules is beyond the scope of this paper. The following paragraphs focus on 
two widely debated issues, which are particularly relevant: (i) the application of 
principles on refusal to deal to price squeeze cases; and (ii) the structure of the cost-
based test applied to identify potentially anticompetitive foreclosure. 
 
                                                 
43 See, inter alia, R. O’DONOGHUE-A.J. PADILLA, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing (2006); A. PERA, supra note __. 
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4. The Need for an Antitrust Duty to Deal 
 
There is a strong link between price squeeze and refusal to deal. As noted 
above, an analytical framework for the assessment of price squeeze is a necessary 
complement to an antitrust duty to deal. Intervention in price squeeze cases may be 
necessary to avoid the elusion of an antitrust duty to deal. At the same time, a ban on 
price squeeze translates into the imposition of a duty to supply under terms and 
conditions allowing equally efficient rivals to compete in a downstream market. 
In antitrust practice and literature, the question has arisen as to whether a 
finding of infringement in price squeeze and refusal to deal cases should be subject to 
the same requirements. If there is no duty to deal under antitrust rules, it could appear 
illogical to punish a dominant firm for having supplied the input concerned under 
conditions that did not allow rivals to operate profitably in a downstream market.44 
In the US, linkLine clarified that a price squeeze is not incompatible with 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act if there is no antitrust duty to deal in the upstream 
market. In the EU, it is not clear whether the input supplied by the vertically integrated 
firm must be an “essential facility” within the meaning of EC case law, and whether the 
application of Article 82 EC to price squeeze abuses is subject to the same strict 
requirements provided for by case law on refusal to deal.45 
The issue was not explicitly addressed by the CFI in Deutsche Telekom, 
although the Court took into account the fact that there was no other infrastructure that 
would have provided rivals with viable entry into the downstream market.46 The 
Commission decision practice does not provide conclusive indications as to whether the 
relevant input must be essential.47 However, in no case did the Commission base its 
                                                 
44 See, inter alia, P.E. AREEDA-H. HOVENKAMP, Antitrust Law, IIIA, second edition, New York: Aspen 
Publisher (2002), 767c5 (“It makes no sense to prohibit a predatory price squeeze in circumstances 
where the integrated monopolist is free to refuse to deal”). See also R. O’DONOGHUE-A.J. PADILLA, The 
Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, Oxford: Hart Publishing (2006), 326-327, according to whom, in 
the assessment of price squeeze cases, it would be necessary at least to take into account the potential 
negative effects arising from the imposition of a duty to supply. 
45 See, for instance, C. MADERO-I. GURPEGUI BALLESTEROS-A. MALHEIRO, Margin Squeeze Abuses: The 
EU Perspective, in GCP, APR-09 (1). 
46 CFI, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, § 236-237. The 
question should be answered in a pending Article 234 reference before the Court of Justice: Case C-
52/09, Konkurrensverket/TeliaSonera AB (pending). The appeal currently pending before the CFI in the 
Telefónica case is also expected to address the issue: Case T-336/07, Telefónica and Telefónica de 
España v. Commission (pending). 
47 In British Sugar/Napier Brown, the dominant firm (a producer of beet sugar) held only 58% of the 
market for granulated sugar and there were alternative supply sources, such as imports from abroad and 
supplies of can sugar by a competitor holding a 37% market share. See Commission decision of 18 July 
1988, Case IV/30.178, Napier Brown/British Sugar, O.J. L 284/41 (1988), §§ 51-54. On the contrary, in 
National Carbonising, the National Coal Board held an almost monopolistic position in the supply of 
coal, which represented the main raw materials used in the production of industrial and domestic hard 
coal. See Commission decision of 29 October 1975, National Coal Board, National Smokeless Fuels 
Limited and National Carbonising Company Limited, O.J. L 35/6 (1976). In Deutsche Telekom and 
Telefónica, the Commission held that there were no valid alternatives to the wireline networks of the 
incumbents for the supply of retail access services, since infrastructures based on other technologies – 
such as optical fiber, wireless, satellites, electric grid and cable – were not sufficiently developed. See 
Commission decision of 21 May 2003, Cases COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom AG, 
O.J. L 263/9 (2003), § __; Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo 
España/Telefónica, ____, § 547 (“ADSL competitors in the retail market could not substitute away from 
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decision on the principles and criteria set out by EC case law on refusal to deal. On the 
contrary, in Telefónica the Commission held that it was not necessary to demonstrate 
that the conditions set out by Oscar Bronner were met,48 in light of the specific 
circumstances of the case. Firstly, Spanish regulation compatible with the EC 
telecommunications framework imposed on the dominant firm an obligation to provide 
wholesale broadband access, on the basis of a balancing test made by the Spanish 
authorities between the incentives to invest and innovate and the need to promote 
downstream competition in the long term. Secondly, it was not necessary to protect the 
ex ante incentives of the incumbent, as its infrastructure was to a large extent the fruit 
of investments undertaken well before the advent of broadband services in Spain and in 
a context where the dominant firm was benefiting from special or exclusive rights that 
shielded it from competition.49 In addition, the Commission noted that, in the previous 
price squeeze cases, the contested conduct was deemed incompatible with Article 82 
EC regardless of the existence of an essential facility under EC case law on refusal to 
deal.50 
In the Guidance, the Commission seems to have modified its approach. The 
Guidance assimilates price squeeze to a constructive refusal to deal. According to the 
Guidance, the intervention of the Commission in price squeeze and refusal to deal cases 
should be based on the same requirements, which echo those set out by EC case law on 
access to essential facilities.51 In particular, refusal to deal and price squeeze cases 
would represent a priority in the Commission enforcement when: (i) the relevant 
product or service is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a 
downstream market; (ii) the practice is likely to lead to the elimination of effective 
competition on the downstream market; and (iii) the practice is likely to lead to 
consumer harm, because the probable negative consequences of the practice outweigh 
over time the negative consequences of imposing an obligation to supply.52 
On the other hand, the Guidance alleviates the burden of proof imposed on the 
Commission by Oscar Bronner, Magill and IMS Health.53 In line with the approach 
adopted in Telefónica, the Guidance states that the Commission does not have to prove 
the specific conditions required for the prohibition of refusal to deal when it is clear 
that the imposition of a duty to supply does not negatively affect the incentives of the 
dominant firm and other operators. This could be the case, in particular, when: (i) 
regulation compatible with Community law already imposes an obligation to supply on 
the dominant undertaking and it is clear, from the considerations underlying such 
regulation, that the necessary balancing of incentives has already been made by the 
regulatory authority; or (ii) the upstream market position of the dominant undertaking 
has been developed under the protection of special or exclusive rights or has been 
                                                                                                                                              
the regional and national wholesale inputs provided by Telefónica by turning to an alternative viable (in 
terms of price, geographical coverage and capacity) wholesale input”); see also §§ 687-688. 
48 See ECJ, Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791, §§ 43-46. 
49 See Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, ____, §§ 
299-309.  
50 See Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, ____, §§ 
__. 
51 See, in particular, Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791. 
52 See COMMISSION, Guidance, supra note __, § 81. 
53 See ECJ, Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791; Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P 
RTE and ITP/Commission [1995] ECR I-743; Case C-418/01 IMS Health [2004] ECR I-5039. 
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financed by state resources.54 In these cases, the Commission would analyze refusals to 
deal and price squeeze cases on the basis of general principles applicable to unilateral 
exclusionary conduct.55 
Thus, both in the US and the EU, price squeeze cases have been analogized to 
constructive refusal to deal. However, the same interpretative choice has led to 
remarkably different results in the two legal systems. In the US, the application of 
general principles on refusal to deal to price squeeze cases resulted in a drastic 
limitation of the scope for antitrust intervention in price squeeze cases. In the EU, 
competition policy in the field of refusal to deal has traditionally been much more 
interventionist. In addition, the Guidance seems to have further widened the scope for 
the imposition of duties to deal on dominant firms. 
The extension of general principles on refusal to deal to price squeeze cases 
seems to be a reasonable policy choice. There are valid reasons to believe that refusal 
to deal and price squeeze represent two sides of the same coin and should be treated 
consistently. If a refusal to deal infringes competition rules, antitrust authorities and 
courts should be able to intervene in the case of price squeeze, in order to prevent 
elusion of the duty to supply. On the other hand, if a refusal to deal is lawful, it does 
not make sense to prohibit price squeeze, since the dominant firm could achieve the 
same result simply by refusing to supply the input to rivals. 
Absent an antitrust duty to deal, it is not easy to identify a rationale for 
prohibiting price squeeze strategies under competition rules. In some cases, a supplier 
may engage in opportunistic and unfair behavior that may harm minor competitors. The 
supplier may induce a downstream competitor to invest in a specific technology that is 
unique to the vertically integrated firm. Then the supplier may increase the price of the 
input, in order to exclude minor rivals or appropriate their fixed cost investment.56 In 
this case, some kind of intervention may be appropriate. However, it is doubtful that 
antitrust rules are a suitable tool for punishing such opportunistic behavior. Assuming 
that the refusal to deal was legal to begin with, price squeeze would not cause any 
incremental consumer harm.57 The opportunistic behavior of the supplier should be 
analyzed on the basis of other sets of rules, such as those on abuse of economic 
dependency and unfair competition. 
Some basis for liability may exist where a dominant firm discovers that a rival 
with an established dealing relationship with the defendant is bent on integrating 
vertically into the monopolized input market, and the dominant firm responds with a 
price squeeze aimed at denying the rival the resources necessary for the vertical 
expansion.58 In this case, the practice may harm consumers in the long run. However, 
                                                 
54 See COMMISSION, Guidance, supra note __, § 82. See also Opinion of Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro delivered on 14 July 2004, Case C-109/03, KPN Telecom BV/Onafhankelijke Post en 
Telecommunicatie Autoriteit (OPTA) (“where the supplier has an advantage in the secondary market 
which it was able to acquire because it was previously shielded from competition, the potentially 
deterrent effect on investment and innovation resulting from the imposition of a duty to supply is 
minimal and is likely to be outweighed by the interest in promoting competition”). 
55 See COMMISSION, Guidance, supra note __, § 82. 
56 Instead of excluding downstream competitors, the vertically integrated firm could limit itself to 
squeeze their margins so that they cover only variable costs. Rivals would be able to stay in the market in 
the short-medium period, but the vertically integrated firm would appropriate the value of their fixed cost 





absent a duty to deal in the upstream market, the application of competition rules could 
have perverse effects, as the threat of future antitrust claims could undermine the 
incentives of the dominant firm to supply the input to competitors in the first place. 
Furthermore, if capital markets work properly, a rival should be able to raise the funds 
necessary to implement its vertical integration project, if it is sustainable and profitable. 
While the extension of principles on refusal to deal to price squeeze cases seems 
to be a positive development (assuming that the European Courts will actually endorse 
the Guidance approach), the expansion of the range of duties to supply that may be 
imposed on dominant firms is much less convincing. The Guidance seems to go beyond 
the strict limits identified by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Oscar Bronner, 
Magill and IMS Health. In these cases, the ECJ tried to balance the need to safeguard 
the incentives to invest and the collective interest in the protection of competition. In 
order to safeguard the incentives to invest and innovate, the ECJ recognized the 
possibility of interfering with the contractual freedom of dominant firms only in 
exceptional circumstances. In the Guidance, the Commission reserves the possibility of 
departing from the strict requirements set out by EC case law when it is clear that it is 
not necessary to protect ex ante incentives. Such an approach cannot be easily 
reconciled with the above-mentioned rulings of the ECJ, which did not intend to allow 
antitrust authorities and courts to carry out a case-by-case assessment of the trade-off 
between preservation of incentives to invest and protection of competition. 
In any case, the two hypotheses explicitly provided for by the Guidance – i.e., 
the existence of a regulatory obligation to supply and the achievement of the dominant 
position under the protection of special or exclusive rights or through state resources – 
seem to open the way for a remarkable intrusion into the commercial freedom of 
dominant firms, which could negatively affect their incentives to invest and innovate. 
The first hypothesis makes the application of Article 82 EC contingent on the 
intervention of a regulatory authority, on the assumption that the latter has already 
carried out the balancing between preservation of incentives and protection of 
competition. Compared to US antitrust law, the Guidance reflects a different 
philosophy of the relationship between antitrust and regulation. In the US, Trinko 
limited the application of antitrust rules in regulated sectors, on the ground that the 
“slight benefits of antitrust intervention” would likely be outweighed by costs and risks 
inherent in judicial enforcement of “detailed sharing obligations”.59 In Credit Suisse, 
the Supreme Court stressed also the risk that the concurrent application of antitrust and 
sector-specific rules would produce “conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, 
privileges or standards of conduct”.60 In the EU, antitrust and regulation have 
traditionally been seen as complementary tools. Regulation does not normally prevent 
the application of antitrust rules.61 Furthermore, the Commission and national antitrust 
                                                 
59 Verizon Communications Inc., Petitioner v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398, 411-
412 (2004). 
60 Credit Suisse Securities LLP v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2397 (2007). 
61 According to established case law, the application of competition rules is possible as long as national 
rules do not deprive firms of any discretion to avoid the contested conduct. The infringement itself must 
originate from regulation for a firm to be immune from liability. See, inter alia, CFI, Case T-271/03 
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, §§ 86-87. Furthermore, once a national 
competition authority has issued a decision finding an infringement of EC competition rules and 
disapplying the anti-competitive national law, the firms concerned are no longer immune from antitrust 
law. See ECJ, Case C-198/01 CIF [2003] ECR I-8055, § 55. 
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authorities have often been willing to use competition rules to support liberalization 
processes and secure the achievement of procompetitive aims of other sets of rules.62 
However, the Guidance seems to go even further, as it implies that regulatory 
measures can orient the interpretation and application of antitrust rules in regulated 
sectors. Once a national regulation has imposed on a dominant firm an obligation to 
supply, the fulfillment of this obligation and the pricing can be examined under 
competition law, provided that the regulatory authority has carried out the necessary 
balancing between incentives and competition. This approach may result in significant 
deviations from competition law principles. The balancing carried out by a regulatory 
authority does not necessarily coincide with the same assessment made by an 
administrative or judiciary authority in charge of applying antitrust rules.63 Regulatory 
authorities may impose obligations to supply beyond the limits set by competition law. 
Indeed, they may adopt measures aimed at actively promoting the development of an 
effective competition, and may take into account factors that go beyond the protection 
of competition.64 
In the US, Trinko clarified that a regulatory obligation to supply does not trigger 
an antitrust duty to deal.65 The Supreme Court made it clear that antitrust courts should 
not be entrusted with the enforcement of regulatory duties to deal, as affirmative 
regulatory duties often go well beyond the generally negative duties imposed under 
                                                 
62 Actually, one of the main drivers of the Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica decisions seems to be the 
dissatisfaction of the Commission with the speed of liberalization of the telecommunications sector under 
national regulations. See P. PALMIGIANO, Margin Squeeze in the United States and in Europe: Stand 
Alone Abuse or Refusal to Deal, in GCP, APR-09 (1); R. O’DONOGHUE, Regulating the Regulated: 
Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission, in GCP, MAY-08 (1). On the relationship between 
antitrust and sector-specific regulation, see also, inter alia, A. PERA, supra note __; D. GERADIN-R. 
O’DONOGHUE, supra note __; S. GENEVAZ, Margin Squeeze after Deutsche Telekom, in GCP, MAY-08 
(1). 
63 See F.E. GONZÁLEZ DÍAZ-J. PADILLA, supra note __. 
64 See CFI, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, § 113 (sector-
specific regulations “have objectives that differ from those of Community competition policy”), and 
EUROPEAN REGULATORS GROUP, Report on the discussion on the application of margin squeeze tests to 
bundles, March 2009, available at 
http://erg.ec.europa.eu/doc/publications/2009/erg_09_07_report_on_the_discussion_of_the_application_
of_margin_squeeze_tests_to_bundles.pdf (“[w]hile competition law is intended to prevent margin 
squeeze as an exclusionary abuse, ex ante regulation seeks the more ambitious goal of promoting 
competition by facilitating entry”). In addition, sector-specific regulation may oblige dominant firms to 
grant access at prices different from those that could be set under competition law criteria. A regulatory 
authority may set high access tariffs in order to stimulate investments and promote a facility-based 
competition. It could appear contradictory that the Commission relies on the judgment of a regulator that 
requiring access will not harm investment incentives, but it departs from the decision of the same 
regulatory authority as to the prices at which access has no harmful effects. See F.E. GONZÁLEZ DÍAZ-J. 
PADILLA, supra note __. Obviously, the Commission would intervene only when a dominant firm has 
sufficient discretion to avoid the infringement by setting its upstream or downstream prices. Nonetheless, 
the Commission would second-guess the decision of a regulatory authority not to intervene, or to leave a 
margin of discretion to the firm concerned at the upstream or downstream level. Ultimately, the 
Commission would remedy the inaction of the regulatory authority or the inadequacy of its intervention. 




antitrust rules.66 The Supreme Court treated the existence of regulation as a reason to 
scale back on antitrust liability, not to expand it.67  
The second hypothesis provided for by the Guidance is based on the assumption 
that there is no need to safeguard investment incentives when a firm has achieved its 
dominant position under the protection of special or exclusive rights or through state 
financing. Even this assumption is questionable. Firstly, even firms that benefit from 
special or exclusive rights or state financing may have fewer incentives to invest and 
innovate, if they are aware ex ante of the ex post exposure to antitrust liability for 
refusal to deal or margin squeeze. Secondly, some investments in the relevant assets 
may have been realized after the termination of the advantages granted by public 
authorities. Thirdly, the fact that a firm benefited from special or exclusive rights for a 
given period does not necessarily imply that it earned a return on any investments it 
made during that period, especially when it was obliged to provide universal service at 
a loss.68 
 
5. The Structure of the Cost-Based Test 
 
In order to ascertain whether a price squeeze strategy would unlawfully exclude 
downstream competitors, a number of alternative cost-based tests have been proposed 
in antitrust practice and literature, namely: (i) whether the downstream divisions of a 
vertically integrated firm could trade profitably on the basis of the wholesale price 
charged to rivals for the relevant input (equally efficient competitor test); (ii) whether a 
hypothetical competitor, which is not as efficient as the dominant firm, but is capable 
of achieving reasonable efficiency levels, could compete in the downstream market on 
the basis of the wholesale price charged by the dominant firm (reasonably efficient 
competitor test); (iii) whether downstream rivals could trade profitably on the basis of 
the wholesale price charged by the dominant firm (actual competitors test); or (iv) a 
combination of the above tests.69  
 
5.1. Equally or Reasonably Efficient Competitor Test 
 
The Commission has traditionally tried to preserve a certain degree of flexibility 
in the choice of the cost-based test applicable to price squeeze cases. In the Notice on 
the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector, the Commission stated that a finding of abusive price squeeze may be based on 
both the equally efficient competitor test and the reasonably efficient competitor test.70  
                                                 
66 Id., at 415-416 (distinguishing between the regulatory goal of “eliminat[ing] … monopolies” and the 
antitrust objective of “prevent[ing] unlawful monopolization”). 
67 See A.M. PANNER, Are Price Squeezes Anticompetitive?, in GCP, APR-09 (1). 
68 See F.E. GONZÁLEZ DÍAZ-J. PADILLA, supra note __. 
69 See R. O’DONOGHUE-A.J. PADILLA, supra note __, 312-317. The definition and the application of a 
suitable cost-based standard raise a series of delicate theoretical and practical issues, which go beyond 
the scope of this paper. For a discussion of some of these issues, see, inter alia, R. O’DONOGHUE-A.J. 
PADILLA, supra note __; M. POLO, Price Squeeze: Lessons from the Telecom Italia Case, 3 Journal of 
Competition Law & Economics 453 (2007). 
70 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector, supra note __, §§ 117-118. According to the Notice, “[a] price squeeze could be demonstrated by 
showing that the dominant company’s own downstream operations could not trade profitably on the basis 
of the upstream price charged to its competitors by the upstream operating arm of the dominant 
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In its decision practice, the Commission has not excluded, in principle, the 
application of the reasonably efficient competitor test. However, in all cases, the 
Commission has actually favored the equally efficient competitor test. In National 
Carbonising, the Commission suggested that the price charged by the supplier of an 
essential input should guarantee the survival of a reasonably efficient downstream 
competitor, but it actually applied a test based on the costs of the vertically integrated 
firm.71 In British Sugar/Napier Brown, the Commission explicitly adopted an equally 
efficient competitor test.72 Similarly, in Deutsche Telekom, the Commission stated that 
“a margin squeeze occurs if the spread between [the dominant firm’s] retail and 
wholesale prices is either negative or at least insufficient to cover [the dominant firm’s] 
own downstream costs”.73 Finally, in Telefónica, the Commission reiterated the view 
that a finding of abuse may be based on both the equally efficient competitor test and 
the reasonably efficient competitor test. However, it held that, in the case under 
investigation, the applicable test was the equally efficient competitor test,74 without 
providing additional clarification.75 
The limited case law of the CFI seems to favor the equally efficient competitor 
test. In Industrie des Poudres Sphériques, the CFI stated that a price squeeze cannot be 
characterized as abusive if a rival’s inability to compete is due to its higher processing 
costs.76 In Deutsche Telekom, the CFI explicitly endorsed the equally efficient 
competitor test adopted by the Commission. In light of the Akzo ruling,77 as well as of 
the precedents on price squeeze, the Court stated that “the abusive nature of a dominant 
undertaking’s pricing practices is determined in principle on the basis of its own 
situation, and therefore on the basis of its own charges and costs, rather than on the 
basis of the situation of actual or potential competitors”.78 The CFI also considered that 
                                                                                                                                              
company”. However, “[i]n appropriate circumstances, a price squeeze could also be demonstrated by 
showing that the margin between the price charged to competitors on the downstream market (including 
the dominant company’s own downstream operations, if any) for access and the price which the network 
operator charges in the downstream market is insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient service provider 
in the downstream market to obtain a normal profit (unless the dominant company can show that its 
downstream operation is exceptionally efficient)”. 
71 See Commission decision of 29 October 1975, National Coal Board, National Smokeless Fuels 
Limited and National Carbonising Company Limited, O.J. L 35/6 (1976) (the supplier of an essential 
input may have “an obligation to arrange its prices so as to allow a reasonably efficient manufacturer of 
the derivative a margin sufficient to enable it to survive in the long-term”). 
72 See Commission decision of 18 July 1988, Case IV/30.178, Napier Brown/British Sugar, O.J. L 
284/41 (1988), § 65-66 (holding that the contested pricing policy was abusive because the margin 
between the dominant firm’s upstream and downstream prices was “insufficient to reflect that dominant 
company’s own costs of transformation”). 
73 Commission decision of 21 May 2003, Cases COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579, Deutsche Telekom 
AG, O.J. L 263/9 (2003), § 140; see also § 102. 
74 Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, ____, §§ 
311-312. 
75 The Commission noted only that the equally efficient competitor test was more favorable to the 
dominant firm than the reasonably efficient competitor test, because a competitor that shared the same 
cost structure as the dominant firm’s own downstream businesses, but that did not enjoy the same 
economies of scale and scope, inevitably had higher unit network costs. Commission decision of 4 July 
2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, ____, § 314. 
76 CFI, Case T-5/97 BPB Industrie des Poudres Sphériques SA v. Commission [2000] ECR II-3755, §§ 
179-185. 
77 ECJ, Case C-62/86 AKZO v. Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, § 74. 
78 CFI, Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, §§ 188-191. 
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“any other approach could be contrary to the general principle of legal certainty”, as 
accurate information on the cost structure of competitors is generally not known to the 
dominant undertaking, which would not be in a position to assess ex ante the 
lawfulness of its own activities.79  
Notwithstanding the clear preference of the CFI for the equally efficient 
competitor concept, the state of the law is still uncertain. In the Discussion Paper and 
the subsequent Guidance, the Commission stated that, as a general rule, it intends to 
make reference to the equally efficient competitor benchmark in the assessment of 
dominant firms’ pricing policies.80 However, the Commission reserved the right to 
depart from the equally efficient competitor test in particular cases. In particular, this 
could happen when, in the absence of the contested practice, a competitor may benefit 
from demand-related advantages, such as network and learning effects, which will tend 
to enhance its efficiency.81 
Some commentators have maintained that the Deutsche Telekom ruling does not 
prevent the application of the reasonably efficient competitor test. According to this 
reading, the CFI approved the choice of the equally efficient competitor test made by 
the Commission in that specific case, but it did not rule out the possibility of adopting a 
different test, based on the cost of a reasonably efficient competitor, when this is 
appropriate in light of market circumstances.82 In recently liberalized network 
industries, new entrants can be at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the incumbent, 
in terms of low market shares, limited availability of infrastructures and lower capacity 
for realizing scale or scope economies. In these cases, a reasonably efficient competitor 
test would be necessary to ensure equality of opportunities between the vertically 
integrated incumbent and minor competitors.83 
The reasonably efficient competitor benchmark is often used in regulatory 
settings,84 but its extension to the antitrust field raises a series of delicate issues. 
Protection of less efficient rivals may represent a coherent policy option for regulatory 
measures, whose goal is to promote competition by influencing the structural 
conditions of the markets concerned. The same kind of intervention is much less 
convincing under antitrust law, which aims at preventing artificial distortions of 
competition by dominant firms through conduct incompatible with the paradigm of 
competition on the merits.  
The equally efficient competitor test ensures that dominant firms can pass 
efficiency gains derived from vertical integration on to consumers. In some cases, the 
application of antitrust rules to protect not yet equally efficient competitors may benefit 
consumers, but it may also produce serious collateral effects. An antitrust intervention 
aimed at preventing the exclusion of potential equally efficient competitors would at 
                                                 
79 Id., § 192. 
80 See COMMISSION, Guidance, supra note __, § 23. 
81 Id., § 24. With regard to price squeeze cases, the Guidance specifies that the Commission will 
generally rely on the cost of the downstream division of the dominant undertaking to determine the cost 
of an equally efficient competitor benchmark. However, it adds that the costs of a non-integrated 
competitor might be used as the benchmark, for example when it is not possible to clearly allocate the 
dominant undertaking’s costs to downstream and upstream operations. Id., § 80. 
82 See S. CLERCKX-L. DE MUYTER, Price Squeeze Abuse in the EU Telecommunications Sector: A 
Reasonably or Equally Efficient Test?, in GCP, APR-09 (1); B. AMORY-A. VERHEYDEN, Comments on 
the CFI’s Recent Ruling in Deutsche Telekom v. European Commission, in GCP, MAY-08 (1). 
83 See S. CLERCKX-L. DE MUYTER, supra note __; B. AMORY-A. VERHEYDEN, supra note __. 
84 See, for instance, EUROPEAN REGULATORS GROUP, supra note __. 
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the same time protect inefficient companies and discourage competitive initiatives, thus 
favoring high price levels, collusive equilibria and productive efficiency losses. The 
potential consumer benefits may not be worth the risks. Furthermore, if capital markets 
work properly, a potential equally efficient competitor should be able, in theory, to 
procure resources necessary to finance a start-up period of below-cost sales. The need 
to protect newcomers and minor competitors may be more intense and durable in 
recently liberalized markets. However, in these markets the issue could be resolved 
more effectively through ad hoc regulatory measures, thus avoiding the creation of 
precedents that might influence the application of competition rules in other sectors.  
In addition, it may be extremely difficult, if not arbitrary, to determine the cost 
level of a reasonably efficient entrant. Reference to actual competitors’ cost level 
would not be adequate, as it could protect inefficient firms. It would also be unclear 
how to determine which rival should be used as the benchmark. In any case, the 
dominant company may not be aware of rivals’ costs. Legal certainty could be 
seriously harmed, as dominant firms may not be able to assess ex ante the lawfulness of 
their own commercial policy.85 Furthermore, the application of the reasonably efficient 
competitor test would likely induce dominant firms to try to collect information on 
rivals’ costs and revenues, thus favoring information flows that could be incompatible 
with antitrust rules. 
 
5.2. The Application of the Equally Efficient Competitor Test in the Case of 
Different Costs or Differentiated Products 
 
It has been noted that, in certain instances, a test based only on the dominant 
firm’s costs and prices may result in wrongly imputing a price squeeze. The fact that 
the margin is lower than the production costs of the dominant firm’s downstream 
division does not necessarily imply that the practice is exclusionary. Rivals may be 
more efficient than the dominant firm and, possibly, may have a different cost 
structure.86 In these cases, a test based on the cost of the dominant firm could offer a 
misleading picture of the impact of the practice on rivals’ competitive capacity and 
profitability. According to some commentators, it would be necessary to verify not only 
whether a hypothetical equally efficient rival would be able to compete, but also 
whether the margin is actually lower than downstream rivals’ costs.87 In other words, a 
price squeeze should be considered abusive only when it fails both the equally efficient 
competitor test and the actual competitors test. 
Furthermore, in case of differentiated products, downstream competitors’ 
margins may be significantly higher than the margins of the dominant firm. As a 
consequence, rivals could be able to make an adequate profit, even though the 
                                                 
85 See R. O’DONOGHUE-A.J. PADILLA, supra note __, 317-318. 
86 The equally efficient competitor test relies on a simple, linear vertical chain of production, within 
which the relevant input represents a high fixed proportion of total costs. In some markets, competitors 
may use a range of different intermediate inputs in combination, whereas technical, regulatory or legacy 
constraints may prevent the dominant firm from using some or all of the same inputs. Id., 331. 
87 Id., 330-332. On the possible application of different benchmarks, see also A. PERA, The Application 
of Art. 82 in Regulated Sectors: The Case of Price Squeeze, in B. Hawk (ed.), International Antitrust 
Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2008, Huntington: Juris Publishing (2009), 34; P. GROUT, 
Defining a Price Squeeze in Competition Law, in E. Hop (ed.), The Pros and Cons of Low Prices, 
Stockholm: Swedish Competition Authority (2004), 71; P. CROCIONI-C. VELJANOVSKI, Price Squeezes, 
Foreclosure and Competition Law, 4 Journal of Network Industries 28 (2003). 
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contested policy fails the equally efficient competitor test.88 In this case, in order to 
ascertain whether a pricing policy can actually exclude the supplier of a differentiated 
product, it may be necessary to look also at its margins. 
However, the application of a cost-based test based on the situation of actual 
competitors may lead to unsatisfactory results. Suppose that the margin between 
upstream and downstream prices is lower than the incremental costs of production of 
the dominant firm’s downstream division, but it is higher than rivals’ costs. 
Competitors’ lower costs do not necessarily reflect a higher efficiency level. They may 
simply reflect an inferior quality level of rivals’ products, specifically conceived to 
satisfy the needs of more price-sensitive consumers. A dominant firm could exclude 
competitors or limit their growth by offering high quality products at a price that does 
not cover its own costs of production at the downstream level, but is higher than the 
costs borne by rivals to produce lower quality products. In this case, the commercial 
policy of the dominant firm would pass a test based on actual competitors’ costs, but it 
would have effects similar to those of the sale of homogeneous products at a price 
lower than competitors’ costs. In both cases, the dominant firm would offer a price-
quality combination that could not be matched by equally efficient competitors. The 
equally efficient competitor test allows for the neutralization of the impact of product 
differentiation. 
Suppose instead that rivals are more efficient than the dominant firm or 
commercialize differentiated products that allow them to earn higher margins. The 
application of a test based on the situation of actual competitors would allow the 
dominant firm to adjust its upstream and downstream prices so as to appropriate 
systematically the possible cost savings realized by rivals, as well as the value created 
by competitors through the commercialization of higher quality products. This would 
reduce the incentives of the vertically integrated monopolist and its rivals to invest and 
innovate to reduce their costs and improve their products.89 
Finally, in most cases, rivals’ costs and margins are not exactly known to 
dominant firms. A test based on the situation of actual competitors would give rise to 
legal certainty issues similar to those raised by the reasonably efficient competitor 
test.90 
In conclusion, it seems preferable to postpone consideration of the situation of 
actual competitors. The costs of the dominant firm’s downstream division represent the 
most reliable benchmark for the application of a cost-based test establishing a 
presumption of legality at a first stage of analysis. Nonetheless, competition authorities 
and courts should take into account factors such as product differentiation and 
differences in cost structures in the subsequent phase of the comprehensive assessment 
of the competitive impact of the practice. In some instances, a price squeeze policy may 
not be able to produce significant exclusionary effects if rivals’ margins are higher or 
their costs are lower than those of the dominant firm. 
                                                 
88 See R. O’DONOGHUE-A.J. PADILLA, supra note __, 330-332. 
89 H.J. HOVENKAMP-E.N. HOVENKAMP, supra note __, notice that the appropriation of a rival’s 
efficiency gains would not necessarily prevent prices from falling. By appropriating the smaller firm’s 
efficiency gains the integrated firm will very likely be prompted to lower its own retail prices. 
Eventually, prices may fall by the same amount. However, the authors recognize that consumer injury 
may result from the reduced incentive that smaller firms have to create efficiencies whose value will 
immediately be appropriated by the dominant firm. 




5.3. The Application of the Equally Efficient Competitor Test when the Supply of an 
Input to Competitors Entails Additional Costs 
 
As noted above, in some instances, a price squeeze may be neither 
discriminatory nor predatory. A squeeze of competitors’ margins may result from the 
fact that supplying an input to rivals entails additional costs. For instance, a dominant 
firm may incur additional costs to interconnect its own infrastructures to a rival’s 
network or to make its input compatible with the technology and production process of 
another operator. If the cost of supplying an input to rivals is higher than the cost of 
providing the same input to an internal downstream division, price squeeze may simply 
be the result of the diseconomies of vertical disintegration.91  
The standard version of the equally efficient competitor test asks whether the 
margin between upstream and downstream prices covers the incremental costs of a 
hypothetical equally efficient competitor in the downstream market. This test is 
expressed by the following formula: 
 
p - a ≥ cd             [1] 
        
where p is the price of the end product, a is the access price and cd is the cost of 
the downstream operations of the vertically integrated firm (without the cost of 
procuring the input).  
If the additional costs of supplying the input to rivals are not negligible, the 
dominant firm may have to set an external price higher than the internal price or 
transfer charge. In turn, this could give rise to a squeeze of competitors’ margins. In 
this case, the application of the standard version of the equally efficient competitor test 
could lead to the prohibition of a price squeeze that would be neither discriminatory nor 
predatory, as it would simply reflect the cost savings arising from vertical integration. 
In order to allow the dominant firm to pass these cost savings on to consumers, it is 
necessary to modify the cost-based test by deducting the additional costs borne to 
supply the input to rivals from the overall costs that should be covered by the margin 
between upstream and downstream prices.92 
The modified test is expressed by the following formula: 
 
p - a ≥ cd - ci             [2] 
 
where ci is the additional cost borne by the vertically integrated monopolist to 
supply the input to rivals.93 
                                                 
91 See supra, § __. 
92 See M. POLO, supra note __; P. CROCIONI-C. VELJANOVSKI, supra note __. 
93 A similar approach was adopted by the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) in the Telecom Italia case. 
The ICA analyzed the replicability of a tender offer submitted by the Italian telecommunications 
incumbent in a procurement for the provision of telecom services to the Italian Public Administration. In 
order to ascertain whether the incumbent had implemented an abusive price squeeze strategy, the ICA 
applied a cost-based test that took into account the diseconomies from vertical disintegration. These 
diseconomies consisted of the cost of a second interconnection kit needed when the lower portion of the 
incumbent’s network was interconnected to the backbone network of a competitor. The same 
interconnection kit was not needed in the case of an integrated architecture. See Decision of the Italian 
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Compared to the basic version of the equally efficient competitor test, the 
modified version imposes on competitors additional efficiency constraints. Rivals can 
enter or stay in a market only if: (i) they are more efficient than the dominant firm; and 
(ii) their higher efficiency level is sufficient to compensate the additional costs borne 
by the dominant firm to supply the input to rivals. As a consequence, downstream 
rivals can be excluded even though they are as efficient as the dominant firm. 
The modified cost-based test is based on the assumption that entry in a 
downstream market should be encouraged only when the end-to-end costs of a 
vertically disintegrated competitor are not larger than the costs of providing the product 
in an integrated architecture.94 If the cost-based test did not take into account the 
additional costs borne to supply the input to rivals, the dominant firm would have to 
behave as though it were less efficient. Its final prices would have to cover costs that 
the dominant firm does not actually incur, to the detriment of consumers. In some 
cases, it might be appropriate to ensure higher margins for alternative operators in order 
to promote the development of effective competition, but such an assessment should be 
referred to regulators rather than antitrust authorities and courts. 
 
6. The Role of Efficiencies in the Assessment of Price Squeeze Abuses under 
EC Competition Law: Waiting for Godot 
 
Given the increasing focus of European institutions on the prevention of price 
squeeze strategies, a clear framework for the analysis of efficiencies would be crucial 
to limit the risk of deterring procompetitive and efficient conduct. Unfortunately, under 
EC competition law, the role of efficiencies in the assessment of price squeeze 
strategies and, in general, abuse of dominance is extremely limited. In Telefónica, the 
Commission analyzed the possible objective justifications and efficiency gains related 
to the contested conduct, but eventually it dismissed all the defenses.95 The Guidance 
states that the Commission intends to take into account possible efficiency gains related 
to price squeeze strategies. However, the Guidance does not seem to have strengthened 
the role of efficiencies in the assessment of price squeeze strategies, as the standard of 
proof on dominant firms is extremely high. Furthermore, the limited indications 
provided by the Guidance are unclear and contradictory. 
According to the Guidance, the Commission will consider claims that a refusal 
to supply or a margin squeeze is necessary to allow the dominant undertaking to realize 
an adequate return on its investments and to safeguard its incentives to invest and 
innovate.96 However, the evaluation standard applicable to refusals to deal and price 
squeeze cases is already based on a balancing between preservation of incentives and 
protection of competition. A finding of abuse would be justified only when the likely 
negative consequences of the practice outweigh over time the negative consequences of 
                                                                                                                                              
Competition Authority of 16 November 2004, No. 13752 (A351), Comportamenti Abusivi di Telecom 
Italia, in Bollettino, No. 31/2004. On the Telecom Italia case, see M. POLO, supra note __. 
94 See M. POLO, supra note __; P. CROCIONI-C. VELJANOVSKI, supra note __. This approach resembles 
the logic of the efficient component pricing rule proposed by some commentators to price access. See W. 
BAUMOL-G. SIDAK, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 Yale Journal of Regulation 171 
(1994). 
95 See Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, ____, §§ 
619-664.  
96 See COMMISSION, Guidance, supra note __, § 89. 
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imposing an obligation to supply.97 As a consequence, it seems unlikely that similar 
considerations will lead to a different conclusion in the subsequent phase of the 
assessment of possible justifications. 
Furthermore, according to the Guidance, to invoke an efficiency defense, 
dominant firms would have to demonstrate the fulfillment of strict conditions, which 
basically resemble those required for benefiting from an exemption under Article 81.3 
EC.98 In particular, dominant firms have to prove that the contested conduct does not 
eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of actual or 
potential competition. In addition, dominant firms have to demonstrate that the likely 
efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely negative effects on 
competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets.99 In Telefónica, the 
Commission underlined that the incentive of the dominant firm to pass cost efficiencies 
on to consumers is related to the existence of competitive pressure from the remaining 
firms in the market and from potential entry.100 
It follows that, according to the Commission Guidance and decision practice, 
the protection of the competitive process is a fundamental value, which prevents the 
application of the efficiency defense in case of risk of elimination of effective 
competition.101 At the same time, the Guidance states that the elimination of effective 
competition on a downstream market is one of the specific requirements for a finding 
of infringement in refusal to deal and price squeeze cases.102 As a consequence, there 
seems to be extremely limited scope for efficiency defenses in refusal to supply and 
margin squeeze cases. In principle, if the specific requirements for a finding of 
infringement are satisfied, there is no valid efficiency defense. 
It could be argued that the availability of the efficiency defense would, in fact, 
be limited to cases in which the Commission considers that it is not necessary to prove 
the specific circumstances referred to in paragraph 81 of the Guidance.103 According to 
the Guidance, this would be the case, in particular, when a regulation compatible with 
Community law already imposes an obligation to supply on the dominant firm on the 
basis of a balancing of incentives made by a regulatory authority, or the upstream 
dominant position has been developed under the protection of special or exclusive 
rights or has been financed by state resources.104 However, in Telefónica the 
Commission held that, in these cases, a price squeeze strategy cannot be considered 
necessary to protect innovation and investments, as there would not be a real need to 
safeguard the ex ante incentives of the dominant firm.105 
                                                 
97 Id., § 86. 
98 Id., §§ 30, 89-90. 
99 Id., § 30. 
100 See Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, ____, §§ 
655-657. 
101 “Ultimately, the protection of rivalry and the competitive process is given priority over possible short-
term efficiency gains”. Id., § 657. 
102 See COMMISSION, Guidance, supra note __, § 81. 
103 Id., § 82. 
104 Id., § 82. 
105 See Commission decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784, Wanadoo España/Telefónica, ____, §§ 
632-634 and 659-663. 
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In addition, the Guidance suggests that the application of the efficiency defense 
is more unlikely when the dominant firm has previously supplied the input in 
question,106 as normally happens in margin squeeze cases. 
In conclusion, under EC competition law, proving the existence of the 
conditions required for the application of the efficiency defense seems to be almost 
impossible. The inconsistencies arising from the approach adopted by the Guidance 
reflect the fact that the conditions set out by Article 81.3 EC cannot be easily extended 
to abuse cases. Under the general approach to exclusionary conduct set out by the 
Guidance, a finding of “anticompetitive foreclosure” requires not only exclusionary 
effects, but also likely consumer harm.107 According to the Guidance, there should be 
no abuse if a practice produces efficiencies such that on balance consumer welfare 
improves. The distinction between the finding of anticompetitive foreclosure, within 
the meaning of the Guidance, and the subsequent assessment of possible efficiencies is 
artificial. A case could be made that the consideration of counterbalancing efficiencies 
should be part of the overall assessment of abuse, rather than postponed to the last stage 
of the analysis, as a defense subject to strict requirements. 
 
7.        Conclusion 
 
Several other facets and implications of the price squeeze story would deserve 
attention. But it is time to conclude an already long paper. 
Its main teaching is that there is no room for an autonomous abuse of price 
squeezing. According to the conventional view of the problem, a virtual Big Brother, 
i.e. a vertically integrated firm, controlling an input that a downstream operator needs 
to deploy in its production, may manipulate the prices emerging in the involved 
markets with the precise goal of suffocating the rival. The perspective is made 
particularly suggestive by the connection established between two distinct, though 
related markets. But the assumed complexity is only apparent. In fact, the integrated 
firm may squeeze its downstream competitor by imposing a discriminatory wholesale 
price, which practically destroys any opportunity for the rival in the final market; or it 
may engage in downstream predatory pricing, possibly supporting this strategy by 
fixing an exorbitant price in the upper market. This being the overall picture, the 
margin compression is dealt with by the traditional doctrines; invoking a new one 
would be simply redundant. From a conceptual point of view, this should be the end of 
the query. The question whether a combination of a lawful wholesale price and a non-
predatory retail price can be characterized as exclusionary conduct based on the 
analysis of the margin between the two prices is to be given a negative answer. As a 
corollary, one should consider that the tightness of the vertical integration, which may 
by-pass internal transfer charges and the like (despite their indisputable relevance), is 
irrelevant, since such an undisclosed price implicitly exists, at least in a theoretical 
vein, and enables the standard analysis. 
The praxis, however, is mostly plagued with an intractable problem. Whenever 
the internal transfer charges within the divisions of an integrated firm are not 
observable, the above clear-cut approach collapses, since it is no longer possible to 
detect discriminatory pricing and downstream predation. The only available data are 
                                                 
106 See COMMISSION, Guidance, supra note __, § 90. 




the external price of the input and the price of the end product. And this is why we need 
(no separate theory of antitrust liability, but) an analytical approach, that is an 
operational tool, aiming to approximate the outcome of a full-fledged scrutiny.  
Instead of mimicking regulatory tools and criteria, the analytical framework for 
the assessment of price squeeze cases should be construed in accordance with basic 
principles of competition law and traditional doctrines of antitrust liability. This 
strongly supports the application of principles on refusal to deal to price squeeze cases 
and the use of the equally efficient competitor test to ascertain whether a given pricing 
policy is anticompetitive. 
 
